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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLOYD WEBSTER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MARY and CHARLES LEHMER, Appeal No. 19339 
Defendant-Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Lehmers Reaffirm Their Statement of The Facts. 
Appellants Mary and Charles Lehmer ("Lehmers") reject 
Respondent Floyd Webster's ("Webster") statement of the facts 
and reaffirm their reliance on the statement of the facts as set 
forth in their opening brief. The Lehmers will not specifically 
rebut each purported fact presented by Webster. However, there 
are three misstatements of fact which must be clarified. 
Responses to those misstatements of fact are set out below. 
2. Webster Did Not Own the Property. 
Webster admits at page 3 of his answering brief that the 
record title to the property on which Webster had lived was in 
Royal Street Land Company. Webster goes beyond that fact and 
attempts to convert the fact of his claim of ownership into the 
the fact of ownership. The issue of the fact of ownership by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Webster was not before the trial court. That issue was never 
adjudicated. At best, Webster had a contingent expectancy or the 
basis for a good faith legal claim to title. 
Mr. Huseth, the former president of Royal Streetf testi-
fied that the informal policy to sell land to squatters was not 
based upon the squatter's legal rights but "on an emotional 
thing." (T 45-46). Webster's claim to a legal title is not a 
marketable title of any value until there has been a judicial 
determination that the legal standard for an adverse possession 
claim has been satisfied. Anderson v. Osguthorpe, 504 P.2d 1000r 
1002 (Utah 1972); Babo v. Bookbinders Financial Corp., 551 P.2d 
63, 64, 27 Ariz. App. 73 (1976). 
When the Lehmers purchased Webster's interest in the 
property, subject to Webster's right to live on the property so 
long as he desired, they only purchased Webster's contingent 
expectancy or the right to stand in his place to assert a claim 
to legal title. Webster admitted that the Royal Street policy 
would probably not apply to a third party purchaser from a 
squatter (T.164) and Webster's compliance with the adverse 
possession statute was at best speculative. The Lehmers pur-
chased an interest in property from Webster which could have and 
may yet turn out to be illusory and of no value. Lehmers in 
effect purchased the opportunity to spend the time and money to 
find out. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3. Webster Was Indifferent to the Ownership of His Property, 
Webster's trial testimony clearly established that he 
was indifferent to whether his land was owned by the BLM or Royal 
Street, Webster's attempt to obfuscate that fact at pages 5 and 
6 of his answering brief is to no avail, Webster's trial testi-
mony was merely a replay of his deposition testimony, 
Q, (By Mr, Gesas): But why didn't you go and see 
if the BLM really owned the land, or if the 
mining company owned it? Why didn't you do 
that before you signed up with them [the 
Lehmers]? 
A. I don't know. I never had no desire to find 
out, I wasn't concerned. 
(Webster 1/7/83 depo. p. 95) 
4» Webster Mistates His Relationship with the Lehmers, 
Webster's statement of the facts and Webster's argument 
are replete with attempts to turn a casual social relationship 
between Webster and the Lehmers into a confidential relationship 
in which Webster was the dependent party. The facts as estab-
lished at trial and in Mr. Webster's deposition are all to the 
contrary. 
Q. (By Mr. Campbell): Nowf at that timef Mr. 
Webster, Mary Lehmer was not acting as your 
lawyer, was she? 
A. No. 
Q» She hadn't acted as your lawyer, had she? 
A. No. 
Q. She wasn't acting as your business advisor, 
was she? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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No. 
Or your financial consultant, was she? 
No. 
She wasn't acting as your real estate advisor, 
was she? 
No. 
She hadn't in the pastf had she? 
No. 
You weren't relying at that time on Mrs. 
Lehmer for some confidential relationship, 
were you? 
Not that I recall, no. 
168). 
(By Mr. Gesas): Have you ever talked to her 
[Mary Lehmer] in confidence, told her your 
deepest secrets or feelings? 
No. 
And you didn't go to her after the death of 
your wife, or go to Charles Lehmer and seek 
advice from them about your daily affairs 
with things you were doing in your life, 
did you? 
No. 
You didn't go ask Mary or Charles how to 
buy or sell property or get groceries or 
how to run your life, did you? 
No. 
And you weren't relying on them for advice 
in your everyday affairs, were you? 
No. 
You were old enough and capable of taking 
care of yourself, weren't you, before October 
of 1980? 
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A, Yes. 
Q. And after? 
A. Still am. 
Q. Thank you. Were Charles or Mary Lehmer your 
advisors before October 7, 1980 and after 
the death of your wife? Were you looking 
to them for any kind of advice? 
A. No. 
(Webster 1/7/83 depo. p. 106-107) 
5. Lehmers1 References to the Published Depositions Are 
Proper. 
Webster concedes at page 17 of his answering brief that 
all depositions were published yet claims that they are "nonevi-
dentiary matters". Webster cites no rule or case law in support 
of his claim that depositions ordered by the Court to be pub-
lished are not evidence in that proceeding. In the case at barr 
the depositions were ordered published at a pretrial conference 
and the trial court noted during trial that in fact the deposi-
tions had been published. (T. 238, 419; R. 301). 
Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets out 
certain specific circumstances under which depositions may be 
used at trial or upon a hearing of a motion. A party's right to 
use depositions for those purposes is founded upon the rules and 
a party need not secure special permission from the trial court 
for the use of the depositions for the purposes outlined in Rule 
32. A party also need not request that the depositions be 
"published" to avail itself of that rule. 
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The publication of a deposition is a different matter. 
Upon an order of publication, the sealed copy of the deposition 
filed with the Court pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure is opened and the deposition becomes a part of 
the record of the proceeding. It is clear from this Court's 
reference to the use of published depositions in cases such as 
Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 477-478 (Utah 
1979) that once a deposition is ordered published in a particular 
proceeding, in Farrow it was a motion for summary judgment, the 
deposition is "before the court". The published deposition is an 
evidentiary matter on which the trial court may rely in entering 
its findings and on which the Supreme Court may rely in reviewing 
the proceeding below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY 
ON FAIR MARKET VALUE WAS IMPROPER. 
Webster's answering brief fails to separately address 
the appellants' two points of error concerning the trial court's 
admission of testimony on fair market value. Webster presents 
only a generalized discussion of some of the prerogatives of a 
trial court in an equitable proceeding in an apparent attempt to 
establish the relevance of the challenged testimony. Webster 
totally ignores Lehmers1 claim of error with respect to the 
admission of the testimony of fair market value of the subject 
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"squatters rights" without proper foundation. That issue pre-
sents a question of competency and foundationf not relevancy. 
An expert's testimony cannot be based on facts which are 
contrary to the evidence. See, Great Western Sugar v. Northern 
Natural Gas, 661 P.2d 684, 694 (Colo. App. 1982); Liber v. Flor, 
415 P.2d 332, 337 (Colo. 1966). In Liber, the Colorado Supreme 
Court concluded that certain expert testimony was incompetent and 
"should not have been admitted into evidence" because "the opi-
nion in question was based on at least two purported facts that 
Summers [the expert] assumed to be true but which were not sub-
stantiated by the testimony of other witnesses or other evi-
dence." JId. In Chicago and North Western Railway v. Hillard, 502 
P.2d 189, 192 (Wyo. 1972), the Wyoming Supreme Court held that 
"the record must show sufficient facts upon which the judgment 
and opinion of an expert were based. A witness who asserts an 
opinion on the value of property not supported by facts is not 
competent; . . . ." 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the admissability 
of expert testimony "depends in large measure upon the foundation 
laid. The expertise of the witness, his degree of familiarity 
with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus between his opi-
nion and the facts adduced must be established." Edwards v. 
Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Utah 1979); Highland 
Construction Co. v. Union Pacific RR. No. 17990, filed February 
3, 1984, P.11. 
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Webster only tangentially addresses the question of 
relevancy and ignores completely the question of competency and 
foundation. The expert testimony of Mr, Pia was incompetent and 
without proper foundation because it lacked the necessary 
"logical nexus" between any facts either asserted by Webster or 
proved at trial. Mr. Pia's opinion as to the fair market value 
of Webster1 s squatter's rights on October 7, 1980 was based on 
the erroneous assumption that Webster owned a fee simple interest 
on that date. Questions of competency and foundation are fun-
damental to the rules of evidence and the reliable, fair and 
efficient operation of the judicial system. Webster's generali-
zations about the rules of equity provide no basis whatsoever for 
abandoning the well established rules of evidence. 
POINT II 
WEBSTER'S UNILATERAL MISTAKES DID NOT 
JUSTIFY RECISSION OF THE CONTRACT. 
Websterr in his answering brief, focuses on a single 
incident in the course of the transaction between Webster and the 
Lehmers and attempts to justify Webster's lack of due diligence. 
Even if the Court were to give credence to Webster's recitation 
of the facts surrounding the October 7, 1980 agreement, Webster 
still fails to take into account the subsequent events. Webster 
on three separate occasions after that date reaffirmed and 
ratified the agreement by seeking payments pursuant to it. In 
addition, Webster entered into a modified agreement on December 
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21, 1980 which reaffirmed the original agreement and relinquished 
his life estate. 
During the entire period of time between October 7, 1980 
and December 21, 1980, Webster was free from any influence of 
the Lehmersf assuming there had been any to begin withf and could 
have investigated the status of his land prior to the various 
reaffirmations of the agreement. The evidence is also clear that 
when it finally did occur to him to attempt to rescind the 
agreement, Webster was quick to travel to the courthouse in 
Summit County to determine the status of his land. (Webster 
1/7/83 depo. p. 49-50). It is also clear, even under the version 
of the facts stated by Webster, that during this period he was 
living with Mary Dudley in Heber City and was not the lonely, 
desolate figure Webster makes himself out to be. (T. 181, 
283-284; Webster 1/7/83 depo. p. 103-104). 
Webster attempts to dismiss his 33 years of lack of 
diligence in determining the status of his property as somehow 
irrelevant. It is clearly relevant to demonstrate the fact of 
Webster's lack of diligence and it is also relevant to demon-
strate that any lack of due diligence by Webster at the time of 
the original October 7, 1980 transaction and subsequent to it was 
simply part of the continuing pattern of indifference on his part 
and not the result of any pernicious influence exerted by the 
Lehmers. 
Webster has no response at all to Lehmers1 claim that 
Webster1s ignorance of the status of his property is irrelevant 
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because there is simply no evidence of reliance upon this alleged 
misinformation. The evidence is clear from Webster1s own testi-
mony that even if he had known his property was not on BLM land 
it would not have made any difference. In his own wordsf he just 
"didn't care" whether or not his property was on BLM land. (T. 
146-148). 
POINT III 
THE ALLEGED MUTUAL MISTAKE 
DOES NOT WARRANT RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT. 
Webster's argument concerning the alleged mutual mistake 
requires only a brief response as all the relevant issues are 
fully explicated in Point III of Lehmers1 opening brief. 
Webster claims that rescission is appropriate because 
the contract created a "hostile marriage" between Lehmers' and 
Webster's children. This is a wholly new argument raised for the 
first time on appeal and not properly cognizable by this Court. 
Nelson v. Newmany 583 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1978); Simpson v. 
General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1970); Hamilton et 
al. v. Salt Lake County Sewerage Imp. Dist., 390 P.2d 235, 236 
(Utah 1964) • In addition, there is simply no evidence in the 
record to support this claim. The reasons for the lack of any 
evidence are clear. The issue was never raised before the trial 
court and it is simply not relevant to this lawsuit. 
Webster further claims that this alleged mutual mistake 
justifies rescission because "severance of the joint tenancy was 
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a condition precedent" to Webster receiving the purchase price 
for his money. It is clear from the testimony from Mary Lehmer 
that she is prepared to proceed with the transaction whether 
Webster has the rights of a joint tenant or a tenant-in-common, 
(T. 303-304). Even if the Court were to assume this was a con-
dition precedent, it is subject to waiver by the Lehmers, and 
clearly the Lehmers have waived the condition. Therefore, even 
if there was a condition precedent, it makes no difference to the 
question of whether rescission is appropriate based upon this 
alleged mutual mistake. 
POINT IV 
WEBSTER FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE 
OF A FIDUCIARY OR CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP. 
Utah has well developed case law on the standards for 
determining the existence of a confidential relationship. That 
case law is discussed and analyzed in light of the facts of this 
case in Lehmers1 opening brief. Webster's ignores this Utah law. 
Rather, Webster simply cites a string of legal authorities on 
various theories not applicable to this appeal. 
Among the citations set out by Webster are references to 
unconscionable contracts and constructive fraud. The issues of 
unconscionability and constructive fraud were not presented at 
trial and they are not a proper subject for appeal. Wilson, 
supra; Simpson, supra. Further, Webster does not advance these 
references as separate legal theories on which he bases his 
claims for relief. 
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In summary, Point IV of Webster's answering brief is 
an eclectic presentation of general legal principles which are 
not related to the facts of this case. Webster provides no use-
ful argument in response to the arguments and analysis presented 
in Lehmers' opening brief on the issue of the existence of a con-
fidential relationship. 
POINT V 
THIS COURT NEED NOT GIVE ANY SPECIAL 
DEFERENCE TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Trial Court's findings on contractual capacity, con-
fidential relationship and the appropriateness of rescission as a 
remedy for the alleged unilateral and mutual mistakes are con-
trary to well established Utah law. The questions at issue in 
this appeal essentially involve the application of the facts in 
this case to the lawf which are legal questions. The Utah 
Supreme Court does not accord the trial court's conclusions on 
questions of law the same deference as accorded findings of fact. 
This Court must make its own independent determination of the 
relevant legal issues. Betenson v. Call Automobile and Equipment 
Sales, 645 P.2d 684f 686 (Utah 1982); Provo City Corp. v. 
Nielsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1982).
 s 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Webster has attempted to piece together isolated, unre-
lated and undocumented pieces of evidence to demand that a valid 
12 
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contract be voided. His demand is not supported by the facts or 
the law. The common thread in all of Webster's claims and legal 
theories is that after voluntarily entering into a valid contract 
he decided that he could have made a better deal. Webster has 
failed to prove that the agreement was unfair or that any legal 
or equitable basis exists for rescinding the contract. The law 
of contracts would be a shambles of every contracting party could 
back out of an agreement by the simple telling of a story of ima-
gined woe. Webster is a capable adult member of society who is 
bound to his word and his contractsf as are we all. 
Respectfully submitted, 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main St.f Suite 1200 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Mary Lehmer and Charles Lehmer 
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